Army Tactical Missile System
War is a constant game of adaption - countermeasures quickly follow new weapons and tactics. The US and other NATO countries wait until Ukraine has a critical need before sending new weapons. It is now difficult for Ukraine to advance without some semblance of air superiority or deep strike. Enter the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). ATACMS is a short-range ballistic missile fired from the HIMARS or M270 multiple launch rocket systems. The version Ukraine received has a 300 km range (edit: it appears the version launched is older with ~150 km range) and contains submunitions that impact a massive area. It is an ideal weapon against airfields, missile batteries, and unhardened command posts. ATACMS provides a lot of value with its $1.5 million price tag.
It appears Ukraine struck a blow against the airfields Russia uses for its attack helicopters with ATACMS, destroying ammunition, aircraft, and maintenance equipment. The Russians must spend a lot of effort building aircraft and maintenance shelters or base their helicopters further away, limiting sorties. These helicopters have been a thorn in the side of Ukraine’s counterattack, making the attack a significant tactical victory.
A more critical task for ATACMS could be suppressing Russian long-range anti-aircraft missile batteries. These batteries tend to be sprawling, hard to shield, and difficult to replace with a $100+ million price tag. ATACMS with cluster munition warheads can destroy any site in Ukraine, including Crimea. They can also limit Russian fighter's ability to operate from bases in Crimea. Russians will struggle to use aviation assets in Southern Ukraine, and the sky will be more open for Ukrainian aircraft, including F-16s.
Modern aircraft will allow Ukraine to counter Russian helicopters and fighters. They will also enable a range of NATO air-to-ground munitions. A thousand guided bombs a month would make a difference in Ukraine’s ability to impact Russian logistics and troop movement. That is well within the current US production capability for systems like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), even with Israel using some stocks.
Russia will find ways to adapt to these new weapons as well. But every capability Ukraine gains makes Russia’s job harder because it limits their degrees of freedom. Rarely does one weapon or tactic win a fight, but a combination that is hard to counter all at once. The number of systems will matter once Ukraine has a near-full slate of capabilities. Ten F-16s or fifty ATACMS probably won’t be enough to put them over the edge. The West must decide if it wants Ukraine to win and commit to providing more artillery, tanks, aircraft, and missiles. Some items need more production, but most of Ukraine’s needs are weapons we are in the process of scrapping. There are ~1000 ATACMS scheduled for decommissioning, entire stockpiles of MLRS rockets with cluster warheads we are destroying, hundreds of armored vehicles and artillery pieces in storage, still millions of rounds of 155mm DPICM shells, aging F-16s and F-18s across many NATO air forces, etc. Sending these weapons to Ukraine would save the US money by avoiding scrapping costs. Our Cold War arsenal is more than capable of trouncing the modern Russian Army.
Russia’s defense production base is also very stretched. They are losing equipment at unsustainable rates, especially artillery and air defense. Aircraft could quickly fall into that category with F-16s and ATACMS. Its production capacity for artillery tubes, air defense systems, and aircraft is limited.
The Soviet stocks still have some legs. In many ways, the current NATO policy is one of maximum cruelty because it maximizes both Ukrainian and Russian casualties by preventing either side from gaining a decisive edge. Drip feeding Ukraine weapons forces them to attrit the entire Soviet arsenal. Even modest support from the West will probably allow Ukraine to win over the longer haul. But the human toll to completely disarm the Russians will continue to stagger.
Drones and Armored Vehicles
Ukraine has likely spent hundreds of millions on drones and other new-age weapons. But these had virtually zero impact on helicopters stationed ~100 km from the front line in a location anyone with Google Maps can find. A few million dollars worth of 1990s missiles devastated them in seconds.
Directly downstream of this is that cluster munitions provide incredible value. In mass production, one 155mm shell costs ~$1000 but can do 10x-100x the damage of the popular FPV drones when adjusted for reliability.
Drones are incredibly useful, but their ability to complement artillery is much more important than attacking targets directly. Activists who have lobbied against cluster munitions have damaged the civilized world’s ability to defend itself.
Tanks and armored vehicles also retain incredible value. Western armor prioritizes protecting soldiers, resisting destruction, and ease of repair. It is a massive financial windfall if an infantry fighting vehicle or tank is damaged while protecting soldiers from drone or artillery fire. Human lives are worth millions each, and most of these vehicles cost a few million each. These vehicles usually only have minor damage and can be repaired by replacing parts that cost less than $50,000. Tanks and IFVs provide mobility and firepower for infantry. They have never been successful without proper support from aircraft and artillery. Ukraine’s inability to break through Russian lines with armor alone should be seen more a failed bet that the Russians would be too disorganized to resist than an indictment of armor.
The role of drones will continue to grow, but the very low-cost ones only operate during the day in good weather at very short ranges. They are also vulnerable to jamming and electronic attack. Eventually, all army formations will have integrated drone defense with very low-cost ammo (shells, lasers, electronic warfare, APKWS rockets, etc.), and drones will have to get more expensive to remain survivable and capable. Again, no single tactic or weapon can carry the battlefield.